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Pennsylvania Landlord Remedies: An
Update
Ronald G. Backer*
I.

Introduction

In the approximately eighteen years since the publication of
Pennsylvania Landlord Remedies: Collection of Rent & Recovery of
Possession,' there have been numerous changes in the law of landlord's
remedies. Some have been helpful to the landlord, such as the recent
amendments to the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951. Others have been
harmful to the landlord, such as distraint being declared unconstitutional
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court. This article is intended to serve as a
comprehensive update of the previous article constituting a complete
survey of recent developments in landlords' remedies in Pennsylvania.
II.

Preliminary Matters

A.

Mitigation of Damages

In the 1882 case of Auer v. Penn,2 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that landlords did not have a duty to mitigate their damages when
tenants abandon leased premises.3 Then in 1979, in Pugh v. Holmes,4 the
court held that leases were in the nature of contracts and are, therefore,
controlled by principles of contract law.5 It was, therefore, expected by
many commentators that when the issue reached the supreme court
again, the historic rule would be reversed and landlords would be held to
* Partner,
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1. Ronald G. Backer, Pennsylvania Landlord Remedies: Collection of Rent &
Recovery of Possession,89 DICK. L. REv. 53 (1984).
2. 99 Pa. 370 (1882).

3. Id at 375-76.
4. 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979).
5. Id. at 903.
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have a duty to mitigate their damages.
However, in Stonehedge Square Ltd. Partnership v. Movie
Merchants, Inc.,6 the court defied the commentators' expectations by
holding that landlords in commercial leases are not required to mitigate
their damages when tenants have breached their lease agreements by
moving out before the end of the term.7 The court gave five reasons for
its decision: (1) the rule is firmly established in Pennsylvania and leases
have been drafted and bargained for in reliance on this rule; (2) the
established rule has the virtue of simplicity and will not result in
litigation as to whether or not the landlord appropriately mitigated its
damages; (3) the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 did not modify the
landlord's non-duty to mitigate damages; (4) there is a fundamental
unfairness in requiring the landlord to mitigate, forcing the landlord to
expend time, energy and money to respond to the tenant's breach; and,
(5) under the assignment and subletting clause in the lease, the tenant had
the ability to find a substitute tenant. 8
Despite the fact that Stonehedge is a unanimous decision (with
three justices concurring), the reasoning is flawed. If the non-mitigation
rule was simple and would not result in litigation over whether or not a
landlord has properly mitigated and a contrary rule would be
fundamentally unfair to a landlord, the same argument would apply to
any contract that is breached. Yet, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
once said in Henry Shenk Co. v. Erie County:9 "The rule that a party
cannot recover damages from a defaulting defendant which could have
been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and effort is applicable
to all types of contracts." 10
The fact that Auer v. Penn is an old case is not a reason to overrule
it. Indeed, the court should have followed another edict of the Pugh
case, which was that "[c]ourts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in
the light of the facts and values of contemporary life-particularly old
common law doctrines which the courts themselves have created and
developed." 1 Furthermore, it is unlikely that many commercial leases
were drafted in reliance in Auer v. Penn, since most attorneys already
assumed that a landlord had a duty to mitigate its damages. While the
6. 715 A.2d 1082 (Pa. 1998).
7. Id. at 1084.
8. Id. at 1084-85. There is a split of authority on this issue outside of Pennsylvania.
See Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Landlord'sDuty, on Tenant's FailureTo Occupy, or
Abandonment of Premises, To Mitigate Damages by Accepting or Procuring Another
Tenant, 75 A.L.R.5th 1 (2000).
9. 178 A. 662 (Pa. 1935).
10. Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
11. Pugh, 405 A.2d at 904 (citations omitted).
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Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 does not address mitigation of
damages, that statute is mainly concerned with landlords' procedural
remedies, not tenants' rights. It has no relevance to the issue of
mitigation of damages. The fact that the defaulting tenant had an ability
to find a substitute tenant should not relieve the landlord of also
attempting to locate a new tenant. A landlord would likely have more
resources available to locate a new tenant than a defaulting tenant would.
2
It is hard to justify the Stonehedge decision in light of Pugh v. Holmes.'
Although the reasoning of the Stonehedge decision applies equally
as well to a residential lease as a commercial lease, the first line of the
decision and the concurring opinion by Justice Zappala make it clear that
the case is limited to a commercial lease. 13 Yet Auer v. Penn involved a
residential lease of a house for five years. 14 For the supreme court to
have been consistent, it should have found no duty to mitigate in all types
of leases, rather than limit the holding of Stonehedge to commercial
leases. In failing to so hold, perhaps the court silently recognized the
unfairness of its position.
Prior to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Stonehedge, a
trial court in Essex House Apartments v. Keyser' 5 held that a residential6
landlord had a duty to mitigate damages upon a default by the tenant.1
The court's analysis was based upon the recognition that the law no
longer characterizes a leasehold interest as a property right, but, rather,
that the landlord-tenant relationship is now a contractual one. It is
unknown whether Essex House has any validity since the Stonehedge
decision. There are no reported decisions addressing a residential
landlord's duty to mitigate damages since Stonehedge. Until the law is
clarified in this case, careful Pennsylvania residential landlords should
continue to mitigate their damages.
Although the Stonehedge decision is not clearly written, the court
appears to conclude that, if there is a specific clause in the lease requiring
landlords to attempt to mitigate their damages, that clause will be
enforced by the courts. 7 A tenant negotiating a commercial lease should
12. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
13. Stonehedge, 715 A.2d at 1082, 1085.
14. Auer v. Penn, 99 Pa. 370, 375-76 (1882).
15. 22 Pa. D. & C.4th 253 (Allegheny 1994).
16. Id. at 257.
17. The supreme court said: "[I]nsofar as the law of contracts is applicable, the nonbreaching party must mitigate his damages." Stonehedge, 715 A.2d at 1084. The
superior court decision is clearer, since it reviewed the lease and found that "nowhere in
the thirty-seven page lease is there a mitigation clause imposing on the Landlord a duty to
mitigate the tenant's damages if the tenant breaches the lease." Stonehedge Square
P'ship v. Movie Merchs., Inc., 685 A.2d 1019, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), affd, 715
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therefore always request that mitigation language be inserted into the
default clause of the lease, thus avoiding the Stonehedge ruling on a
lease-by-lease basis. In many cases, a landlord will want to mitigate
damages, no matter what the lease says. A tenant who abandons
property is often unlikely to be able to pay a large judgment for rent, and
the landlord would not want to risk losing a rental stream from a new
tenant based upon the hope of collecting rent from the defaulting tenant.
In a shopping center situation, a landlord would not want an empty
storeroom, even if the rent were collectible from the defaulting tenant.
B.

Rent Due After Termination of the Lease

One of the most difficult issues in landlord-tenant law arises when
the landlord terminates the lease for non-payment of rent and evicts the
tenant. Is the tenant liable for the rent due, after the termination, until the
end of the original term of the lease? Obviously, to make the landlord
whole, after a default by the tenant, the landlord should be entitled to all
of the rent that is due after termination, at least until such time as the
landlord re-rents the premises.
The Pennsylvania law on this issue is not helpful for the landlord.
Numerous cases, such as Mack v. Fennell,18 have held that, once a lease
is terminated as result of an eviction, the tenant is not liable for any
further rent due under the lease.
This issue was addressed in a recent ruling by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court on confessions of judgment.' 9 Rule 2972 of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which relates to confession of
judgment for possession of real property, states: "If an instrument
authorizes judgment to be entered in ejectment and for money, the entry
of judgment for money shall not prevent the entry of judgment in
ejectment. ' ' 20 It has always been the common practice of landlords in
Pennsylvania, who had a confession of judgment clause in a commercial
lease, to confess judgment for accelerated rent through the end of the
term, along with a judgment for possession. The accelerated rent
judgment was often in such a large amount that it could not practically be
collected, but the landlord hoped to evict and then eventually to collect
some rent from the tenant for the time period after the tenant had been

A.2d 1082 (Pa. 1998). Of course, if the court is willing to enforce a mitigation clause in a
lease, most of the reasons for not requiring mitigation when there is no clause in the lease
make little sense.
18. 171 A.2d 844 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961); see Backer, supra note 1, at 59-62.
19. See Homart Dev. Co. v. Sgrenci, 662 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
20. PA. R. CIV. P. 2722.
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dispossessed from the premises.21
HomartDevelopment Co. v. Sgrenci22 put a stop to that practice. In
that case, the landlord had confessed a judgment for possession, along
with a judgment for accelerated rent through the end of the term.23 In
disapproval of that practice, the superior court held that a "landlord must
elect whether to confess judgment for possession and for all monies then
due, or to confess judgment for all monies for the entire term. 24 The
court further held that the accelerated rent judgment, in that case in the
amount of $234,900, should be stricken, because it was grossly
excessive. 25 The judgment for possession was not stricken, although it
was opened so that factual issues could be resolved in the lower court.26
Based upon this ruling, a landlord may confess a judgment, in one
complaint, for possession of premises and for overdue rent as of the date
of the confession, but not for any rent due after the date of the
confession. The Homart decision thus limits the use of confessions of
judgment by landlords.
There appears to be, however, significant good news for landlords
in the Homart decision. Although the language is somewhat unclear and
is dictum, the court also said: "When the judgment is entered for
possession, the landlord is, of course, entitled to recover, as damages in a
civil action, those losses which he suffers in attempting to relet the
premises for the term of the lease. 2 7 The court appears to be saying that
rent due after an eviction is collectible as damages for breach of contract,
not as rent, until such time as the landlord mitigates damages. The court
approved at least one calculation of those damages, as set forth in the
lease at issue in the case.28
The Homart case, and prior cases cited therein, gives some
guidance to landlords. First, whenever landlords desire to dispossess a

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Homart, 662 A.2d at 1097-1102.
Id.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at ll01.
Id. at 1102. The court could not actually strike the judgment, because no petition

to strike had been filed in the lower court.

26. Id.
27.
28.

Id.atilol.
Id. (emphasis added). The lease language that the Pennsylvania Superior Court

approved in this case is not very helpful to the landlord. Upon termination, the landlord
was entitled to the difference between the rent through the balance of the term and the
fair rental value of the lease through the end of the term. See id. If the fair rental value
of the lease is subtracted from the rent due under the lease, before the landlord has found
a substitute tenant, the landlord will not be made whole. Thus, if the damages that the
landlord is permitted to collect, after termination of the lease, is limited to those damages,
the Homart decision is of little value to the landlord.
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tenant, the landlords should never state or use the word "termination" or
concede that they are terminating the lease. Landlords should simply be
attempting to recover possession. Second, the lease itself should always
have language in it stating that, even if the lease is terminated, the tenant
shall remain liable for all damages under the lease as a result of any
breach of lease by tenant, including damages in the nature of rent due
through the end of the term of the lease. In this way, landlords have a
better chance of collecting the rent due under a lease even after the tenant
has been evicted from the premises.
Stonehedge Square Ltd. Partnership v. Movie Merchants, Inc. is
also relevant to the issue as to whether tenants are liable for rent after
they have been evicted from the premises. If a tenant who abandons the
property is liable for the rent through the end of the term,2 9 surely a
tenant who defaults in the payment of rent and must be legally evicted
should also be liable for the rent through the end of the term. The logic
of Stonehedge requires such a ruling. Why give greater rights to tenants
who refuse to vacate voluntarily the leased premises for which they are
not paying rent?
III. Collection of Rent and Other Damages
A.

Suit Before DistrictJustice

The main development in actions for rent before a district justice is
the increase in the jurisdictional limit. In 1992, the jurisdictional limit of
actions for damages before a district justice, including those based upon
leases, was increased from $4,000 to $8,000.30 As will be discussed later
in this article, in 1995, there were a number of changes made in the
procedures before a district justice involving an eviction of a tenant.
However, if the landlord's claim is for rent only, there has been no
change in the procedures. A tenant, under either a residential or
commercial lease, would still have thirty days to appeal a judgment
involving money only, and an appeal will operate as an automatic
supersedeas. 3 1

29.
1998).
30.

See Stonehedge Square Ltd. v. Movie Merchs., Inc., 715 A.2d 1082, 1084 (Pa.
See Act of Dec. 16, 1992, P.L. 1089, 1992 Pa. Laws 167 (codified as amended at

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515(a) (2001)).

31.

See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P.D.J. 1002(a), 1008(a).
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Confession of Judgmentfor Rent and Possession
1.

Execution

The most significant changes regarding confessions of judgment
involve, execution on judgments. In Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien
& Frankel,32 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit called into
question the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure allowing execution on confessed judgments as to a debtor who
did not knowingly waive his constitutional rights to notice and a
hearing. 33 As a result of that decision, several rules were amended or
added.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure relating to confessions
of judgment for money no longer permit a confession of judgment for
money pursuant to an instrument executed by a natural person in
connection with a consumer credit transaction.34 A "consumer credit
transaction" is defined as a credit transaction primarily for personal,
family or household purposes. 35 The complaint in confession of
judgment must contain a separate averment that the case does not involve
36
a consumer credit transaction.
A residential lease clearly involves a consumer credit transaction.
However, if there was any doubt, rule 2970, which relates to confession
of judgment for possession, clearly prohibits a confession of judgment
pursuant to "a residential lease executed by a natural person. 37
Although some federal courts had previously outlawed confessions of
judgment for possession in some counties in Pennsylvania,3 8 these
amendments to the confession of judgment rules are new law in
Pennsylvania.39
Prior to the 1995 amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure, a landlord could confess judgment for rent and immediately
have the sheriff execute on the tenant's assets, or, the landlord could
confess a judgment for possession and immediately have the sheriff start

32.
33.

20 F.3d 1250, 1271 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1271.

34.

PA. R. Civ. P. 2951.

35.
36.

Id. 2950.
Id 2952(a)(3).

37.
38.
39.

PA. R. Civ. P. 2970.
See Backer, supra note 1,at 93.
In Federman v. Pozsonyi, 529 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), the Pennsylvania

Superior Court held that a confession of judgment for possession arising under a
residential lease was appropriate where there had been a knowing, voluntary and
intelligent waiving of due process rights. Id. at 533.
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eviction proceedings. 40
Those practices have been halted by the
additional notice provisions in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
For a confession of judgment for money, the landlord must give one
of three notices to the tenant: a thirty-day notice prior to the filing of the
praecipe for execution, a different notice given at least thirty days prior
to the sale of real property, or a notice served with the writ of
execution. 4' For a confession of judgment for possession, the landlord
must give one of two notices: a thirty-day notice prior to the filing of a
praecipe for a writ of possession or a notice served with the writ of
possession.4 2 The Rules of Civil Procedure should be consulted as to the
form of a notice, and the procedures subsequent to giving the notice.
The net result of these 1995 amendments is to limit confessions of
judgment to commercial transactions, and to delay the landlord in
executing or evicting on a confessed judgment in a commercial
transaction. These results are all the more reason why a landlord will
want to start an eviction action before the district justice.
2.

Miscellaneous Cases Addressing Confessions of Judgment in
Leases

In Homart Development Co. v. Sgrenci, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court confirmed prior law and held that, where a judgment was entered
pursuant to a lease that contained a confession of judgment clause, but
the judgment was for an excessive amount, the court will correct the
judgment pursuant to a petition to open judgment.4 3 However, where the
judgment is for a grossly excessive amount, such as for accelerated rent
44
when authorized by the law or the lease, the judgment will be stricken.
In PerrySquare Realty, Inc. v. Trame, Inc.,45 the superior court held
that a warrant of attorney to confess judgment in a lease which had been
executed by the tenant, but not the guarantor, could not be used against
the guarantor. 46 In Federman v. Pozsonyi,47 the superior court found that
where a tenant had employed an attorney to negotiate a lease on the
tenant's behalf, the tenant would have difficulty proving that the tenant
did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the tenant's due process rights

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

E.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 2958.1 cmt.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2958.1-.3.
Id. 2973.2-.3.
662 A.2d 1092, 1101-02 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); see also PA. R. Civ. P. 2983.2.
See also Riley v. Raudeski, 23 Lebanon Co. Leg. J. 58, 59-61 (1985).
693 A.2d 1320, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
Id. at 1321-22.
529 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
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in executing a lease containing a confession of judgment clause.4 8
C. Distraintand Related Remedies
As noted in the previous article, 49 during the 1970s and 1980s, the
federal courts of Pennsylvania raised serious questions about the
constitutionality of the distraint procedures in the Landlord and Tenant
Act, 50 although they never completely abolished the practice. However,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court abolished the process in 1986 with its
decision in Allegheny
Clarklift, Inc. v. Woodline Industries of
51
Inc.
Pennsylvania,
In that decision, the court carefully reviewed all of the federal court
decisions addressing the constitutionality of the distraint procedures.
The court stated: "[T]he state having once authorized private action in
conjunction with its own officials, must ensure at the outset that the
procedural scheme to be followed is beyond (constitutional) reproach. ' 2
The court found distraint to be "nugatory," that is, of no force or
53
inoperative.
In the Allegheny Clarklifit decision, the superior court never stated
clearly that the entire distraint procedure is unconstitutional.54 Any
ambiguity however, was resolved by later court decisions. In Langley v.
Tiberi,55 the superior court confirmed that distraint was declared
unconstitutional in Allegheny Clarklift,56 and, in Smith v. Coyne,57 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that distraint had previously
been declared unconstitutional by the superior court.58
A distraint is very similar to a self-help repossession, which is
discussed later in this article. 59 In a distraint action, the landlord levies
on personal property, posts a notice of levy on the door, and asserts some
control over the personal property on the premises. In most cases, the
landlord padlocks the premises.6 ° If the landlord now conducts an
unconstitutional distraint or something similar to the tenant's goods on
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.at 533.
Backer, supra note 1, at 78-79.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.302-.404 (West 2001).
514 A.2d 606, 609 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Id. at 609.
Id.
See id.
528 A.2d 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
Id. at 210 n.3.
722 A.2d 1022 (Pa. 1999).
Id. at 1025.
See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
Backer, supra note 1, at 77.
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the leased premises, does the tenant have a'remedy against the landlord?
Hoyt v. Christoforou61 involved a situation where a landlord
unilaterally took possession of the tenant's equipment by physically
barring the tenant from entering the premises. 62 No official distraint was
conducted, although the effect was the same. The landlord then sold the
goods to a new tenant.63 The superior court held that this action by the
landlord "constitutes an unauthorized exercise of dominion and control
over the property [restaurant equipment] and, thus, a conversion."
Although this case did not involve an action for damages, the superior
court clearly authorizes a damage action by the tenant in the appropriate
circumstances. Thus, a landlord should never attempt an illegal seizure
of a tenant's property because a landlord who is owed money would
prefer to be a plaintiff in a collection action against the tenant rather than
a defendant in a conversion action brought by the tenant. 65
Since distraint is unconstitutional, there is no longer any landlord's
lien in Pennsylvania. The landlord does not have a landlord's lien in the
absence of a distraint.66 However, the landlord's preference in the
proceeds of an execution sale taking place on the demised premises
is
67
still valid, since that preference is not based upon a prior distraint.
D.

Garnishment of Wagesfor Tenant Damages

There is a little-known remedy available to the landlord when the
tenant has caused damages to portions of a residential property, such as
abusing the walls, floors, ceilings or other physical makeup of the
demised premises. If a court or a district justice enters a final judgment
against the tenant, the landlord has the right to garnish the tenant's wages
to satisfy the debt.68 This remedy applies only to collection of a
judgment for damages to the demised premises and not for overdue
rent.69 The maximum amount that may be garnished in a pay period is
ten percent of the tenant's wages or a sum that does not place the
debtor's income below the poverty income guidelines, whichever is

61. 692 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
62. Id. at 220.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 223.
65. In the body of the Hoyt decision, the superior court seems to have forgotten that
it declared distraint unconstitutional in the Allegheny Clarklift case. See id.
66. In re Uni-Lab, Inc., 282 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1960); Rager v. Elias, 6 Pa. D. &
C.4th 582, 584 (Fayette 1989)
67. See Backer, supra note 1, at 83.
68. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8127(g)-(h) (2001).
69. Id. § 8127(a).
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less. 70

The money is to be paid by the employer to the prothonotary on a
periodic basis and the prothonotary is to forward the proceeds to the
landlord.71
While the statute gives some guidance for the procedures to be used
in the garnishment process, the statute specifically states that, to
implement the wage garnishment, the landlord "shall comply with the
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure and any applicable local rules. 7 2
Unfortunately, for the landlord, there are no rules that deal with
garnishment of wages in a civil action.73 There are general execution
rules in Pennsylvania that govern garnishments, but these are used for
fixed judgments against a fixed asset such as a bank account.74 There is
no procedure for periodic payments to the prothonotary.
Unless a county has enacted local rules to deal with the situation,
there is no appropriate method for garnishing the wages of a tenant to
satisfy a judgment for damages to the premises. Until new rules of civil
procedure are enacted, this section of the Judicial Code will be used
rarely by landlords.
III. Evictions
A.

Actions Before the DistrictJustice
1.

Expedited Procedures Before the District Justice

The 1995 amendments to the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, and
the related amendments to the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for
District Justices, have substantially reduced the time involved in an
action for the recovery of possession of real property. The periods for
the notice to quit are now as follows: for a lease of one year or less or for
an indefinite term and where the term of the lease has expired or the
tenant has breached a condition of the lease, the notice must be at least
fifteen days; for a lease of more than one year and where the term of the
lease has expired or the tenant has breached a condition of the lease, the
notice must be at least thirty days.75 In either situation, where the breach

70. Id. § 8127(a)(3.1)
71. Id.
72. Id. § 8127 (a) (3.1)-(3.2).
73. There are rules governing wage attachments in family cases. See, e.g., PA. R.
Clv. P. 1910.21. These garnishments are handled by the domestic relations section of the
court, see id., which would not handle a landlord-tenant case.
74. See, e.g., id. 3140-48.
75. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 68, § 250.501(b) (West 2001) (amended 1995).
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of the lease is the failure to pay rent, the notice need only be ten days.7 6
These periods can be reduced or the notice to quit waived in its entirety
by the terms of the lease.77 Service of the notice by certified or regular
mail is still not effective.
The procedures before the district justice have also been expedited.
The district justice must set the hearing not less than seven nor more than
fifteen days from the date the complaint is filed.79 If the landlord is
successful at the hearing before the district justice and the matter
involves a residential lease, the landlord may request an order for
possession (assuming no supersedeas has been obtained by the tenant)
after the tenth day following the date of the entry of the judgment by the
district justice.8 0 The residential tenant then has ten days to vacate the
premises after service of the order for possession or the tenant may be
evicted forcibly. 8' In a commercial lease, the order of possession may
not be obtained until at least fifteen days after the entry of the judgment
by the district justice and the commercial tenant has fifteen days after
service of the order of possession
to vacate voluntarily the premises
82
before being evicted forcibly.
2.

Appeals from the Decision of a District Justice

The most controversial of the 1995 changes to tenant eviction
procedures involves appeals from the district justice to a court of
common pleas. There is a significant distinction between the procedures
applicable to residential tenants and those applicable to commercial
tenants, with the rules applicable to residential tenants being much more
76. Id. Under the prior law, for example, if the breach was non-payment of rent, the
notice was fifteen days between April 1 and September 1 and thirty days during the
remainder of the year. Id. (West 1994).
77. Id. § 250.501(e) (West 2001).
78. Id. § 250.501(e)-(f). The notice to quit is jurisdictional and without a properly
served notice even an appeal from a district justice judgment will be dismissed. Fulton
Terrace Ltd. v. Riley, 4 Pa. D. & C.4th 149, 154 (Fulton 1989); see also Gafoor Realty v.
Upshaw, 140 Pitt. L.J. 122, 122-23 (1991). For HUD subsidized housing, the notice to
quit must be very detailed as to defaults by the tenant or the notice to quit will not be
effective as a matter of federal law. Pheasant Hill Estates Assocs. v. Milovich, 33 Pa. D.
& C.4th 74, 78 (Dauphin 1996).
79. PA. R. Civ. P.D.J. 504. Prior to the 1996 amendment to Rule 504, the hearing
date could be as much as twenty days from the filing of the complaint. Id. cmt.
80. Id. 515(B).
81. Id. 515(B), 519(B). Previously, for both residential and commercial tenants, the
order for possession could not be obtained for at least fifteen days from the district
justice's judgment and the tenant had fifteen more days to vacate the premises voluntarily
after service of the notice of possession.
82. Id. 515(A), 519(A).
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strict. These rules were held to be constitutional by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Smith v. Coyne.83 For a residential tenant, the appeal
period was reduced from thirty days to ten days.84 For a commercial
tenant, the appeal period remains at thirty days.85 For either type of
tenant, to obtain a supersedeas on appeal, the tenant must deposit with
the prothonotary a sum of money, or a bond, in an amount equal to the
lesser of three month's rent or the rent actually in arrears on the date of
the filing of the appeal, based upon the district justice's judgment.86
Thereafter, every thirty days, the tenant must deposit the monthly rent
due under the lease with the prothonotary.87
With regard to the initial deposit with the prothonotary, a literal
reading of rule 1008(B) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for
District Justices indicates that the amount to deposit based on arrears
would include the amount on the district justice judgment plus the
additional monthly rent that comes due between the date of the judgment
and the date of appeal. Most prothonotaries, however, use the amount in
arrears as set forth in the district justice judgment, so that prothonotaries
do not have to make any calculation on their own.
If the initial deposit is made, the prothonotary notes that a
supersedeas has been granted on notices sent to the landlord and the
district justice. If, thereafter, the tenant fails to make the monthly rental
payments that are required to be paid, the prothonotary, upon praecipe
filed by the landlord, shall terminate the supersedeas. The prothonotary
will then give notice of that termination to the tenant and, presumably,
the district justice, and the landlord may then proceed to obtain an order
of possession from the district justice and proceed to evict the tenant,
even though an appeal is still proceeding. 88
Before the 1995 amendments, the amount that was deposited by the
tenant with the prothonotary remained with the prothonotary until a final
disposition of the appeal. This could cause serious financial harm to
small landlords, who need the monthly rental payments to pay the
mortgage and other expenses. This problem is now addressed by
Pennsylvania Rule for District Justices 1008, which provides that, upon
application by the landlord, the court shall release appropriate sums from
83.

722 A.2d 1022, 1024 (Pa. 1999).

84.

PA. R. Civ. P.D.J. 1002.

85. Id.
86. Id. 1008.
87. Id.
88. The statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.513 (West 2001), provides that the
tenant must deposit all of the rent that was determined to be due and owing by the lower
court, without the limit of three-months rent in arrears. Id. The Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure for District Justices have modified the statute.
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the escrow account to the landlord while the appeal is pending. It is
significant that the release of sums is limited to "appropriate" sums and
that is not accomplished by a ministerial duty on the part of the
prothonotary. 9 Instead, it must be done on motion to the court. 90 That is
because, in certain cases, such as where the tenant's defense is lack of
habitability of the leased
premises, the landlord may not be entitled to all
91
escrow.
in
sums
the
of
3.

Appeals from Rent Claims Only

If the landlord files an action for possession and overdue rent
against the tenant, and the tenant decides to only appeal the rent portion
of the judgment, what is the period for appeal? Logically, the rent
portion of the judgment is no different than any collection action filed
before a district justice and, therefore, the thirty-day appeal period
involving money judgments should apply. The Pennsylvania Superior
Court, however, has ruled differently.
In Cherry Ridge Development v. Chenoga,92 the landlord brought
an action against a residential tenant for eviction and overdue rent and
repairs to the demised premises before the district justice. 93 Judgment
was awarded in favor of the landlord for possession of the premises and
$297.48 for rent and repairs.94 The tenant filed a notice of appeal and a
petition for supersedeas in court beyond the ten-day appeal period.95
Although the tenant recognized that the appeal of the possession order
was untimely, the tenant argued that, because the notice of appeal was
filed within thirty days of the district justice judgment,
the appeal from
96
timely.
was
judgment
the
of
portion
the money
The Pennsylvania Superior Court disagreed. It stated that the
proper appeal period was ten days because the tenant did not appeal from
a judgment only for money, but rather, from a judgment for possession in
a residential lease, with an ancillary award for damages.9 7 The superior
court relied on the language of the statute, not the Rules of Civil

89. PA. R. Civ. P.D.J. 1008.
90. Id.
91. Indeed, the statute permits the tenant to apply to court to have sums released
while the appeal is pending to compensate directly those providers of habitable services
that the landlord is failing to provide under the law and the lease. tit. 68, § 250.513(d).
92. 703 A.2d 1061 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
93. Id. at 1062.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1063.
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Procedure for District Justices, and gave no explanation as to why a
money judgment 98for rent should be treated differently than any other
money judgment.
The official note to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure for
District Justices 1002 was amended, effective as of January 1, 2001, to
override, in effect, the Cherry Ridge decision. The note now states that,
when the appeal is taken "from any judgment for money," the thirty-day
appeal period applies. 99 The explanatory note from the Minor Court
Rules Committee specifically notes that the changes were made to
address the Cherry Ridge decision. 100
In addition, the notice of judgment forms used by the district justice
contradicts the Cherry Ridge decision. That form states: "If a party
wishes to appeal only the money portion of a judgment involving a
residential lease, the party has 30 days after the date of entry of judgment
in which to file a notice of appeal with the prothonotary/clerk of courts
of the Court of Common Pleas Civil Division."' 0 ' With that form in
place, and with the revision to the note, a residential tenant could argue
that an appeal, after ten days but before thirty days, from the rent portion
of a district justice judgment is timely, but, if not, was caused by
administrative error and should be permitted. 0 2 It would also constitute
"good cause shown" for a late appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
03
Civil Procedure for District Justices 1002(B).1
4.

The "Pay and Stay" Rule

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure for District Justices 518 is
known by landlords, without affection, as the "pay and stay" rule. It
applies when a judgment for possession has been entered by the district
justice solely for the payment of rent. Under those circumstances, the
tenant has the right, up until the time that the tenant actually is evicted
from the premises, to pay the constable or sheriff who is conducting the
the proceeding and to
eviction the rent actually in arrears and the costs of
04
put an immediate stop to the eviction proceeding.1
The note to the rule 518 makes it clear that the rent in arrears
98.

Id.at 1062-63.

99.

PA.R. Civ. P.D.J. 1002.

100.

Id.

101.

ADMIN. OFFICE OF PA. COURTS, SUPREME COURT OF PA.,

FORM AOPC 315A-99,

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT (1997).

102. See, e.g., Cherry Ridge, 703 A.2d at 1063; see also McKeown v. Bailey, 731
A.2d 628, 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
103.

PA. R. Civ. P.D.J. 1002(B).

104. Id518.
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includes only those sums that are shown on the order for possession and
does not include any rent that has accrued between the date of the order
0 5 This has been codified as
of possession and the date of the eviction.
06
part of the Landlord and Tenant Act.'
The problem with this rule occurs when a tenant habitually pays the
rent late, causing the landlord to institute a district justice action, and
then the tenant stops the eviction proceeding by paying the rent and other
costs to the constable. Although the landlord is reimbursed for out-ofpocket costs and receives payment of overdue rent, the landlord is really
not made whole. The landlord is out the administrative costs and the
time and aggravation involved in pursuing the tenant. When the same
tenant causes this problem repeatedly, there should be some relief for the
landlord.
The rules of procedure do not address this problem. However, the
issue arose in Brown v. WilliamsportHousing Authority.'0 7 In that case,
the court held that the pay and stay rule did not apply to tenants who
08
were evicted for repeated failures to make timely payment of rent.'
However, the court limited its decision to public housing landlords and
distinguished the situation of a private landlord.'0 9
In Three Rivers Manor v. Little,"0 a trial court held that, even
where a district justice judgment for possession has been appealed to the
court, and the tenant then loses in court, the tenant would still have the
right to prevent an eviction by paying the rent in arrears."11 The court
stated that, even after an appeal, "the Legislature determined that fairness
dictated that a lease not be forfeited for non-payment of rent if the tenant
was able to pay the rent actually in arrears at any time before the
execution of a writ of possession."'' 12
In that situation, the landlord could be harmed if the appeal has
taken some time and the tenant can stay the eviction by only paying the
amount of the original district justice judgment. However, if the tenant
has received a supersedeas by paying the appropriate sum to the
prothonotary and the landlord moriitors the subsequent monthly
payments of tenant to ensure that they are timely made, then the landlord
will have suffered little financial harm. Once again, however, the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.505 (West 2001).
17 Lyc. 292 (1989).
Id. at 294-96.
Id.
139 Pitt. L.J. 296 (1991).
1d. at 297-300.
Id.
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landlord will not have been reimbursed for the administrative costs and
aggravation, and, since the matter is now in court, attorney's fees.
B.

CommercialEviction Actions Before the DistrictJustice

As other remedies, such as confession of judgment, distraint, and
self-help repossessions, have either been eliminated, or at least, had their
effectiveness limited, 1 3 it makes sense for commercial landlords to
The
commence their eviction actions with the district justice.
proceedings have been expedited while the case is before the district
justice, and, even though there is still a thirty-day appeal period for the
commercial tenant, a case commenced with the district justice can be
resolved finally, even if there is an appeal, faster than if an ejectment
complaint had been originally filed in court. More importantly, a tenant
must deposit rent into escrow during any appeal, in order to maintain a
supersedeas. There is no such requirement if the action is originally
commenced in court, and a tenant may remain in possession during the
pendency of any original court proceeding without any security being
posted.
1.

Jurisdictional Limit

There is no jurisdictional limit on the type of lease that may be
subject to a landlord-tenant action before the district justice. The statute
which sets forth the jurisdiction of the district justice confers jurisdiction
for "[m]atters arising under ...the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951
which are stated therein to be within the jurisdiction of a district
justice."' 14 The Landlord and Tenant Act provides for hearings,
judgments and writs of possession in eviction actions. 1 5 Thus, if the
landlord is seeking only an eviction, there is no jurisdictional problem
with the district justice.
If the landlord includes a rent claim with the eviction claim, the
maximum amount of rent that can be claimed is $8,000.' 16 If a claim is
made for more than $8,000, the entire complaint will be dismissed. In
Ryder v. Prospect Park Realty Co., 117 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
specifically held that the monetary limits of the district justice's
jurisdiction applied to claims for rent that were joined in an eviction

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See generally Smith v. Coyne, 772 A.2d 1022 (Pa. 1999).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515(a)(2) (2001).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.502-.504 (West 2001).
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515(a)(3).
211 A.2d 53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
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action. 118 The court appears to 11
have
stricken both the judgment for rent
9
and the judgment for possession.
If the landlord seeks possession and has a claim in excess of $8,000
in rent, the landlord may waive the portion of the claim in excess of
$8,000 and bring the entire matter before the district justice. The statute
specifically states that an appeal by the defendant of the judgment by the
district justice automatically revokes the waiver.' 20 When the tenant
appeals, the landlord must file a new complaint in court. In that
complaint, the landlord may seek both possession and damages in excess
of $8,000.
In the event the landlord prevails against the tenant and the district
justice awards a judgment for possession and for back rent of $8,000,
may the landlord bring a separate cause of action against the tenant for
any additional rent that is overdue? That difficult question can only be
answered in the context of Pennsylvania's common law rule against
splitting causes of action.
2.

Splitting Causes of Action

It is well settled in Pennsylvania that the "law does not permit the
owner of a single or entire cause of action to divide or split that cause so
as to make it the subject of several actions.,, 121 For example, if a plaintiff
is involved in an automobile accident, that party may not bring one
action for damage to the car and a later action for personal injuries. Both
claims must
be brought in a single action or the second action will be
122
dismissed.
In a contract setting, where the contract is entire and not severable,
only one lawsuit may be brought on it. However, where the contract is
divisible, separate actions may be brought on each part of the contract,
23
without running afoul of the rule against splitting causes of action.1
The test for determining whether a contract is entire or severable depends
upon the consideration to be paid.' 24 If the consideration
is apportioned
25
to a particular item, the contract is severable. 1
118. Id. at 54.
119. Id.at 55.
120. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1515(a)(3).
121.

3 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 18:1 (West 2002).

122.
123.

Kessler v. Old Guard Mut. Ins. Co., 570 A.2d 569, 573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
Fitzpatrick v. Branoff, 470 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. 1983). See generally, 3

STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D §§ 18:1-:17 (discussing splitting causes of

action).
124. Bryen & Weil v. French & Keeley, 157 A. 367, 368 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1931).
125. Id.
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Leases are considered to be divisible contracts in Pennsylvania. In
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. Atlantic Richfeld Co.,126 the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held, in a statute of limitations case,
that, as to each payment due under a lease, "a separate and distinct cause
of action would accrue."' 127 Thus, a landlord may bring a separate cause
of action against a tenant for each installment of rent as it becomes due,
provided that the landlord brings "his suit for all the instalments [sic]
which have accrued at the time of the bringing of his action."'' 28 Put
another way:
It is undoubtedly true that all installments that are due when an
action is brought must be included in the one action; and if an action
is brought when more than one is due, a recovery in such action will
installments
be an effectual bar to a second suit brought to recover
29
which were due when the first action was brought.'
Thus, if the landlord reduces a rent claim to $8,000 on an eviction action
before the district justice and the tenant does not appeal, the landlord will
have waived the right to bring a later suit for rent that had accrued as of
the filing of the district justice action, but not for rent that subsequently
accrues.
3.

Eviction Action Only Before the District Justice

Another strategy would be for the landlord to bring only an eviction
action before the district justice, and then bring a separate rent collection
action against the tenant after the tenant has been evicted. Would this
violate the rule against splitting causes of action? There are no cases on
point. However, logically, the action for possession should not bar any
subsequent action for rent.
Section 250.301 of the Landlord and Tenant Act specifically states
that a "landlord may recover from a tenant rent in arrears in an action of
assumpsit as debts of similar amount are by law recoverable.' 30 There is
no requirement that the action for overdue rent be joined with the district
justice action in ejectment. It may be argued that the inclusion of that
section in the Landlord and Tenant Act was done specifically to reserve
the right of a landlord to bring a separate action for breach of contract,
without being required to employ the other remedies in the Landlord and

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

375 A.2d 890 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977), affd, 394 A.2d 491 (Pa. 1978).
Id. at 892.
Stiles v. Himmelwright, 16 Pa. Super. 649, 652 (1901).
Bryen, 157 A. at 363-69 (citations omitted).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.301 (West 2001).
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Tenant Act, such as distraint or an action before the district justice.
In fact, prior to the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, a district
justice (or justice of the peace) could not award rent in an action for the
recovery of possession.' 3' "It was necessary, therefore, for a landlord to
collect rent due and unpaid at the expiration or termination of a lease in a
separate proceeding.'' 32 Historically, then, the causes of action for
eviction and rent were split into two proceedings. The Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1951, as amended, changed the historical procedure, but
only to a limited extent. The maximum rent claim that can be brought is
now $8,000, which may not provide a full and complete remedy for the
landlord. 33 Thus, the right to split the causes of action into two
proceedings should still apply at the present time. There is nothing in the
language of the Act that leads to a contrary conclusion.
The proceedings before the district justice were designed to provide
a speedy remedy for landlord evictions. A landlord who invokes that
remedy should not also risk the opportunity to collect the rent that is due,
just because of the $8,000 jurisdictional limit for money actions brought
before a district justice. Thus, the courts should affirm the right of a
landlord to commence an eviction action before the district justice, and
delay the rent collection action until such time as the tenant appeals or
the tenant is evicted from the leased premises.
C.

Materialityof Breach

Whether the landlord first brings an eviction action before the
district justice or in court, the landlord must prove a material and
substantial breach on the part of the tenant to justify a forfeiture of the
lease. 134 The case of Cimina v. Bronich135 is illustrative.
That case involved a lease that was in existence for many years,
pursuant to which the tenant was to pay the real estate taxes. 136
Nevertheless, for eleven years, the landlord paid the real estate taxes and
never billed the tenant. 37 When the landlord realized the mistake, the
landlord served a notice to quit upon the tenant, ordering the tenant to
vacate because the tenant had allegedly breached provisions of the
131.

2

M.

STERN,

TRicKETT ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD

AND

TENANT

IN

PENNSYLVANIA § 4701 (3d ed. 1973); see also Ballou v. Mehring, 28 Pa. Super. 156, 160
(1905).
132. Ryder v. Prospect Park Realty, 211 A.2d 53, 55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1965).
133. See supranotes 114-20 and accompanying text.
134. See Backer, supra note 1, at 89-91.
135. 503 A.2d 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), rev'don other grounds, 537 A.2d 1355 (Pa.
1988).
136. Id. at 428.
137. Id.
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lease. 38 The trial court found, however, that the tenant's failure to pay
the real estate taxes was not a material breach of the lease as would
justify a forfeiture of the lease. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court affirmed.
The superior court first stated the general rule as follows: "Equity
does not favor forfeiture and courts greatly hesitate to enforce one,
especially when the contract has been carried out or its literal fulfillment
'' 39
has been prevented by oversight or uncontrollable circumstances."
The court then set forth some of the tests for determining materiality of
breach, as follows:
(a) the extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial
benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated; (b) the extent to
which the injured party may be adequately compensated for
damages for lack of complete performance; (c) the extent to which
the party failing to perform has already partly performed or made
preparation for performance; (d) the greater or less hardship on the
party failing to perform in terminating the contract; (e) the0 willful
neglect or innocent behavior of the party failing to perform.14
In finding a lack of materiality of breach, the court emphasized that the
tenant complied with all other provisions of the lease and the landlord
would be made whole when the tenant paid the taxes.
Other cases have held that an action in ejectment may not be based
upon the tenant's criminal conviction for activities unrelated to the leased
premises 141 or upon the violation of a statute by the tenant in the absence
of an express statutory provision to that effect142 or upon implied
covenants in a lease. 143 However, in Cambria-StoltzEnterprises v. TNT
Investments, 144 the superior court held that the tenant's failure to obtain
insurance listing the landlord as a co-insured was a material breach of the
lease, justifying a forfeiture. 45 The court noted that the tenant's act was
willful, having ignored a letter from the landlord requesting the same and
that not designating the landlord as a co-insured on
an insurance policy
46
could result in dire consequences for the landlord. 1

138. ld.
139. Id. at 429.
140. Id.
141. Highland Glen Ltd. v. Hawkins, 25 Lebanon Co. L.J. 193, 194-95 (1988).
142. Ross v. Gulf Oil Corp., 76 Luz. 128, 129-31 (1986), affd, 522 A.2d 97 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981).
143. 202 Marketplace v. Evans Prods. Co., 824 F.2d 1363, 1367 (3d Cir. 1987).
144. 747 A.2d 947 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
145. Id.at 951.
146. Id.
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Nonpayment of rent is a breach of the lease that is material, and
justifies a forfeiture of the lease. This principle was confirmed by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Goodwin v. Rodriguez, where the court
said: "[F]orfeiture for non-payment of rent has always been permissible
under our law." 147 Perhaps more importantly, the court stated: "The
landlord is not obliged to subsidize or 'carry' delinquent tenants with all
of the risks that that involves, indefinitely into the future."' 148 Impliedly,
the landlord may bring an action for eviction, even if the tenant has
missed only one month's payment of rent.
D. Eviction of Drug Traffickers
In 1998, the legislature enacted the Expedited Eviction of Drug
Traffickers Act.1 49 Because this Act is located in Title 35 of Purdon's
Statutes, in the Health and Safety Volume, and not with the Landlord and
Tenant Act, in Title 68, landlords may overlook this new statute. The
purpose of the Act is "to ensure the swift eviction and removal of
persons who engage in certain drug-related criminal activity on or in the
immediate vicinity of leased residential premises. '1 50
If drug-related criminal activity has occurred on or within a rental
unit, the landlord may file a complaint for immediate eviction with the
court, which shall set a hearing on the matter on an expedited basis and
within fifteen days following the filing of the complaint.' 5' If the court
finds that drug-related criminal activity has occurred, and the tenant has
been unable to prove an affirmative defense or an exemption to complete
eviction, an eviction shall be ordered. 5 2 In some circumstances, there
will be an order for a partial eviction of only the individual who was
involved in the criminal activity. The eviction order is to be enforced by
the appropriate law enforcement agency. 153 The Act is limited to
criminal activity, that is, the manufacture, sale, distribution or possession
with the intent to sell54a drug, and not simply the use of an illegal drug on
the leased premises.1

147. 554 A.2d 6, 9 (Pa. 1989).
148. Id.; see also Vill. Beer & Beverage, Inc. v. Vernon D. Cox & Co., 475 A.2d 117,
121 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Edison Vill. v. White, 112 Dauphin Rep. 344, 346-48 (1992).
149. Expedited Eviction of Drug Traffickers Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-151
to -179 (West 2001).
150. Id.§ 780-152(3).
151. Id.§ 780-164.
152. Id.§ 780-156 to -157.
153. Id.§ 780-160.
154. Id.§ 780-153.
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V.

Repossession and Abandonment

A.

Self-Help Repossession

The most influential common pleas court decision in landlordtenant law is Wofford v. Vavreck,1 55 written by President Judge Thomas
of Crawford County in 1981. This was the first reported decision
outlawing self-help repossessions in Pennsylvania, at least as to
residential tenants. The Wofford
decision has been almost uniformly
56
followed in Pennsylvania.'
A self-help eviction constitutes any acts undertaken by a landlord
that prevents a tenant from using the leased premises, other than by
judicial process. It is not limited simply to barring the tenant's access to
the leased premises. A self-help eviction may include removing the
tenant's personal property, using or threatening to use force or violence,
reducing or disconnecting utility services,
or removing parts of the
157
structure itself, such as doors or windows.
Although Wofford and many of the other decisions in this area
arose in the context of residential leases, the language of the decisions is
usually not limited to residential leases. For example, in O'Brien v.
Jacob Engle Foundation, Inc.,' 58 a lower court
specifically enjoined a
59
self-help repossession in a commercial setting.'
B.

Abandonment

Sometimes a tenant will abandon the leased premises but leave
personal property on the site. This presents a dilemma for the landlord,
who would like to clear the premises and rent to a new tenant, but does
not want to be sued for conversion of the tenant's property by disposing
of it.
Bednar v. Marino160 did not make matters any easier for landlord.
In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated:
As a general rule, a tenant does not forfeit or lose title to his personal

155. 22 Pa. D. & C.3d 444 (Crawford 1981).
156. But see Edmonds v. Donald, 40 Pa. D. & C.3d 220 (Phila. 1984), in which the
lower court stated that self-help eviction procedures are not prohibited where the default
is something other than the non-payment of rent. Id. at 221-23. This decision is outside
the mainstream of most court decisions on self-help evictions.
157. Lenair v. Campbell, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d 237, 240 (Phila. 1984).
158. 47 Pa. D. & C.3d 557 (Cumberland 1987)
159. Id. at 558-59; see also Macaluso v. Macaluso, 12 Carbon Co. L.J. 128 (1989),
aff'dmem., 588 A.2d 568 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
160. 646 A.2d 573 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
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property by neglecting to remove it from the leased premises after
the termination of the lease. This is so even if the tenant fails to
remove his personalty within a reasonable time after the expiration
of the lease. Any retention, use or disposal of the tenant's property
by the landlord, or any other exercise of dominion over it to the
exclusion of the rights of the tenant, constitutes a conversion of the
tenant'sproperty by the landlord.161
This strong position taken by the superior court is unfair to the landlord
and fails to recognize the landlord's interest in clearing the premises of
the tenant's property.
To alleviate the Bednar holding, if there is rent that is due from the
tenant, the landlord can sue the tenant, obtain a judgment for the overdue
rent, and then have the sheriff execute on the personal property at the
leased premises to satisfy the debt. The landlord can purchase the
property at the sale and, with a valid bill of sale from the sheriff, dispose
of the property as the landlord sees fit. Another approach would be to
store the goods for a period of time and give notice to the tenant that,
after a certain date, the goods will be deemed abandoned and disposed of
by sale or other means. Of course, the best solution is to address the
issue in the lease, giving the landlord the contractual right to dispose of
the goods after notice to the tenant. Or, the lease could grant to the
landlord a security interest in all personal property on the leased
premises, allowing the landlord to exercise rights under Article 9 of the
1 62
Uniform Commercial Code.
C.

Counterclaim by the Tenant

The landlord should always desire to be the plaintiff in the
litigation, either evicting the tenant or collecting overdue rent from the
tenant.
Furthermore, the landlord should always try to avoid a
counterclaim by the defendant. The Bednar case suggests one such
counterclaim: conversion of the tenant's property by the landlord.
Earlier in this article, there was a discussion of Hoyt v. Christoforou,
63
which recognized a potential claim by the tenant for unlawful distraint. 1
Williams v. Guzzardi' 64 involved a claim for intentional infliction of
161.

Id. at 577-78 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Pikunse v. Kopchinski,

631 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), the court upheld an award of $7,139 for
compensatory damages and $7,500 for punitive damages against a landlord who threw
away a
162.
163.
66.
164.

tenant's personal property after the tenant failed to pay rent. Id. at 1052-53.
13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9503-04 (2001).
692 A.2d 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); see also supra text accompanying notes 61875 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1989).
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emotional distress brought by a tenant against a landlord., 65 In that case,
the landlord, in attempting to evict the tenant from the leased premises,
removed the door to his apartment, told a police officer that the tenant
was a trespasser after tricking the tenant into giving up the apartment
key, did not allow the tenant to remove his belongings but, instead, threw
them into the street, and publicly announced the tenant was evicted for
running a house of prostitution. 66 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit affirmed a $25,000 jury verdict in favor of the tenant, stating:
"Even a person who is unable to pay his rent is entitled to be treated with
167
minimal human dignity."'
In Kuriger v. Cramer,'68 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
considered whether a landlord's use of self-help to evict the tenant, rather
than legal process, gave rise to a trespass action by the tenant against the
landlord. 169 While the court did not take a position on that issue, it did
note that other jurisdictions, such as the District of Columbia and
Delaware, recognized such a cause of action. 170 The superior court also
referenced Wofford v. Vavreck for the principle that landlords have been
17
enjoined by lower courts in proceeding with a self-help repossession. '
It seems therefore, that in the appropriate case, the superior court would
recognize a cause of action for wrongful
eviction by the landlord if the
7
judicial process for eviction is not used. 1
VI. Conclusion
The past eighteen years have seen a limitation on most of landlord's
speedy remedies, such as distraint, self-help repossession and confession
of judgment. The result has been to place more importance on landlordtenant actions before the district justice, a process that has become
somewhat expedited with the 1995 amendments to the Landlord and
Tenant Act of 1951. So long as the courts do not put unreasonable
limitations on a landlord who is seeking eviction through a district-justice
proceeding, the law today more effectively balances landlords' and
tenants' rights when there is a dispute as to tenants' right to possession or
liability to pay rent.
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166. Id. at 47-48.
167. Id.at 52.
168. 498 A.2d 1331 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
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170. Id. at 1337 n.14.
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172. See Commonwealth v. Kitchen Appliances Distribs, Inc., 27 Pa. D. & C.3d 91,
91-93 (Somerset 1981) (recognizing, in case involving commercial lease, a cause of
action in either assumpsit or trespass for wrongful eviction).

